


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Access to Reserve Component Units and Individuals
..., because it's important


by

Gary M. Profit

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Chairman, Joint Military Operations Department

Faculty Advisor

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Preface

In this essay, the author traces the rich legislative history associated with access to Reserve component forces, focusing principally on the post-Cold War period. With active participation by various elements of the federal executive and legislative branches, it presents a study in "good government." The debate is continuing and healthy, and one can readily discern its evolving nature.

A short discussion of Total Force Policy from its inception in the years following the Vietnam War through the end of the Cold War precedes the body of the paper. It serves as more than an introduction. It ensures that the reader realizes the importance of the dialogue.

In order to limit the length of the essay, the author assumes the reader has a rudimentary understanding of the legislative process and of Reserve component issues. Only when deemed necessary to understand the development of critical ideas is background information provided.

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Total Force Policy

Searching for ways to rebuild the Army during the post-Vietnam period, Melvin Laird, President Nixon's Secretary of Defense conceived the Total Force Policy. Introduction of the policy, however, was left to James Schlesinger, Laird's successor, and General Creighton Abrams, the Army Chief of Staff (CSA).

General Abrams returned from a tour in Vietnam near the end of the war, and, with his appointment as CSA, was destined to preside over the post-war restructuring of the Army. Abrams had served as the Army Vice Chief of Staff during the build-up for Vietnam and remembered the difficulties in doing so without mobilizing the Reserves maintained for just such a contingency. He saw his daunting challenge as an opportunity to ensure that the Reserves would be available in any future conflict of significant proportion.

General John Vessey, who would become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), attributed Abrams' efforts to his view of the national character:

He thought about that an awful lot, and concluded that whatever we're going to do we ought to do it right...as a nation. Let's not build an Army off here in the corner someplace. The armed forces are an expression of the nation. If you take them out of the national context, you are likely to screw them up. That was his lesson from Vietnam. He wasn't going to leave them in that position ever again. And part and parcel of that was that you couldn't go to war without calling up the Reserves.¹

As has often been the case in American history, the end of the war ushered in a period of rapidly diminishing resources for the military. Envisioning a force structure of 16 combat divisions, General Abrams sought a means to build three additional divisions; however, he recognized that fiscal constraints demanded it be done within existing strength. "A revised force structure that integrated Reserve and Active elements so closely as to make the Reserves virtually inextricable from the whole"² made it feasible.

Colonel Harry Summers observed:

The post-Vietnam Army General Abrams sought to create was designed deliberately to form an interrelated structure that could not be committed to sustained combat without mobilizing the Reserves. This structure became a reality by 1983, when roughly 50 percent of the Army's combat elements and 70 percent of its combat service support units - engineers, maintenance, transportation, communications, and supply - were in the National Guard and Army Reserve. General Abrams hoped this...would correct one of the major deficiencies of the American involvement in the Vietnam War - the commitment of the Army to sustained combat without the explicit support of the American people as expressed by their representatives in Congress.³

The effects of the Total Force Policy were soon evident in all of the Services. By September 30, 1993, the Ready Reserve accounted for 34.6% of total mobilization personnel, compared to 32% for the Active component (AC).⁴ This partnership in the total military force was further reflected in Service composition: The Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) accounted for 57.3% of the Army; the Naval Reserve 36.1% of the Navy; the Marine Corps Reserve 38.4% of the Marine Corps; the Air Force Reserve (USAFR) and Air National Guard (ANG) 41.1% of the Air Force; and the Coast Guard Reserve 31% of the Coast Guard.⁵ More importantly, significant capabilities are retained in each of the Service Reserve components (RC) (See Appendix A).

Why rely on Reserve forces? Why not structure an Active force capable of fighting the Nation's wars? The debate has raged throughout American history. Prior to the American Revolution, colonists eschewed a standing army as the first step in the loss of liberty, and, since the beginning of the Republic, Americans have sought inexpensive alternatives to a large standing army. Suffice it to say that Reserve forces are a part of our tradition, our

national ethos. In On Strategy, Colonel Harry Summers states:

American antimilitarism springs from a variety of causes historical, cultural and social. It has been a constant since the beginning of the Republic. As far as the Regular Army went, it was even true in wartime. Someone remarked that the old British doggerel about the professional soldier, "It's Tommy this, and Tommy that, and chuck him out, the brute...But it's 'Savior of his Country', when the guns begin to shoot [emphasis in the original]," never applied here in America. It was the "citizen soldier" -- the National Guard and the Army Reserve -- not the regular who fought America's wars and was the traditional "Savior of his Country."⁶

In discussing RC participation in the Persian Gulf War, Mr. Arnold Punaro, then Staff Director of the Senate Armed Services Committee, stated it a little differently: "The active services had already gone to war, but the nation didn't go to war until the Guard and Reserve were mobilized."⁷ Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall may, however, have most aptly reached the bottom line when he stated the case of the American people in August 1944:

As with a properly organized citizen army reserve no officers or men need be maintained in the Regular Army to perform duties which can be performed effectively in time by reserve officers and reservists, the dimensions and cost of the peace establishment, under such system, are necessarily reduced to a determinable minimum.⁸

In any case, general repudiation of the Total Force Policy seems improbable. With that conclusion come challenges, for implicit in the integrated force design is

the need for early and assured availability of the RC in times of national crisis. The vision of its founders can only be realized with commensurate authority to gain access to the RC.

Good government...

Good government? Swept away by current political rhetoric, some may suggest that it is an oxymoron, rendering any further reading a waste of time. In an effort to diffuse some of the controversy, it may be useful to place the phrase in a contextual framework.

The "Contract with America" includes a host of legislative initiatives. Among them is one addressing national security issues. H.R. 7--The National Security Revitalization Act was passed by the House of Representative in the first 100 days of the One Hundred and Fourth Congress and is pending action in the U.S. Senate. It, therefore, seems clear that even the most strident anti-governmentalists in Congress have no intention of abrogating the responsibilities of the federal government.

While examples of what it is not are pervasive, what characterizes "good government" seems somewhat elusive. For the purposes of this essay, it seems appropriate to confine

the elements to those engendering general consensus. At the very foundation, it probably includes active participation of the branches of the federal government (the means) to address matters of great national importance (the ends). Without belaboring the issue, good government is a partnership between executive, legislative, and judicial branches, attending to the affairs of State. Adopting such a benign "definition" may encourage even the skeptical to continue reading.

...in action

In the Cold War, RC combat and support forces were designed to mobilize and deploy quickly to augment active duty forces to defeat a global threat from the Soviet Union. Title 10, U.S. Code (USC), included five levels of authority under which access to Reservists and Guardsmen could be gained: Total Mobilization, Full Mobilization, Partial Mobilization, Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC), and Selective Mobilization (See Appendix B).

At the outset of the post-Cold War period, defense planning began to emphasize new dangers: regional instability; transnational threats; proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; and threats

posed by reversals in the democratization and reform in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere.⁹ In The Bottom Up Review: Forces for a New Era (BUR), the Department of Defense (DOD) identified a strategy and force structure responding to the threats, in which the RC were given broad responsibilities in "war and contingency operations; domestic emergencies; and peace operations."¹⁰ Since access was still principally governed by laws and policies instituted during the Cold War, it should not be surprising that some changes might be necessary to ensure that forces could respond to the new post-Cold War dangers.

Remembering the challenges faced during the Persian Gulf War, the Clinton Administration moved to address shortcomings in applying Cold War laws and policies to post-Cold War situations. Specifically, legislative remedy was deemed necessary to seek relief from limitations on the length of activation under 673b, early access to critical capabilities, and relief from limitation on access to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The Department of Defense Legislative Program for the First Session of the 103d Congress included proposals to amend 673b that would address the first two issues.¹¹

House Bill, H.R. 2401, "to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1994 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes,"¹² included a provision "that would amend section 673b of title 10, United States Code, to provide a permanent increase in the existing Selected Reserve call-up authority from 90 to 180 days for both the initial and an additional period of service."¹³

In amendment, the Senate offered a provision "that would authorize the President to delegate to the Secretary of Defense limited authority to call up units and members of the Selected Reserve under 673b of title 10, United States Code. No more than 25,000 members of the Selected Reserve could be on active duty at any one time under this authority."¹⁴ The Senate position also required written notification of Congress within 24 hours of exercising the authority.

In the House Report 103-357, Conference Report to accompany, H.R. 2401, the National Defense Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160), conferees agreed to delete both provisions. The report stated that:

The conferees generally support making the reserves more accessible in the expectation of increased reliance upon them. However, the conferees are reluctant to expand the existing call-up authorities before exploring in hearings the implications of any such changes for the reserve components and employer support of the reserve components.¹⁵

In September, 1993, following completion of the BUR, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs established the Senior Level Working Group on Accessibility of Reserve Component Forces "to identify and develop solutions for a full range of accessibility issues, legislative and regulatory changes, mobilization policy guidance, use of volunteers, and methods to meet domestic mission needs more effectively."¹⁶ Comprised of representatives of DOD, Service secretariats, the Joint Staff, the RC, U.S. Transportation Command, and U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and supported by action officer working groups, the Senior Level Working Group rendered its report in April 1994. The report highlighted the results of the Working Group's analysis and deliberations and serves as a useful framework within which to identify DOD RC accessibility initiatives.

The report of the Working Group dismissed the possibility that the RC would not be ordered to active duty should vital U.S. interests be threatened and offered as policy that:

- For major regional conflicts (MRCs) and major domestic emergencies, access to Reserve component units and individuals through an order to active duty without their consent will be assumed.
- For lesser regional conflicts, lesser domestic emergencies, and peace operations where RC capabilities could be required, maximum consideration will be given to voluntary access to RC units and individuals before seeking an order to active duty without their consent.¹⁷

The BUR was explicit on the role of the RC in war and contingency operations:

During regional contingencies, Guard and Reserve forces will continue to provide - as they have in the past - significant support forces, many of which would deploy in the early days of conflict. Reserve component combat forces will both augment and reinforce deployed active forces and backfill for active forces deployed to a contingency from other critical regions.¹⁸

It is important to remember that, in addition to combat and support units and individuals supporting Active forces in a theater of operations, RC forces will be employed to backfill Active force deployments. Furthermore, the RC will be called upon very early to assist in mobilization and deployment operations.

The National Guard in each state is immediately available to the governor to respond to domestic emergencies. Unfortunately, state response is often insufficient, and federal assistance is required. The report cited two initiatives. First, the Southern Governors Association acted in 1992, under their own state laws, to develop a "compact" authorizing participation of Guard forces across state lines. Required congressional ratification is pending. Additionally, DOD is reviewing and clarifying the authority for involuntary access to federal RC and seeking to expand the use of volunteers.

The report suggests that peace operations may present the greatest challenge and offers three alternatives for further exploration. One idea is to place sufficient capabilities in the AC. When contemplating such an approach, it is probably useful to remember that unique skills, highly relevant in the conduct of peace operations and humanitarian assistance exist in the RC. They capitalize on civilian-acquired or -maintained skills, and allow a dynamic force development process a measure of relief in a fiscally constrained environment. If this option has any merit, it is in the context of peace

operations. Rather than a repudiation of the Abrams Doctrine and Total Force Policy, the policy might advocate increased utilization of RC individual volunteers, but reduced reliance on RC units.

A second is to expand existing volunteerism. Although all Services employ volunteerism to some extent, the USAFR and the ANG have the most developed programs. A significant percentage of the Bosnian airdrop and airland sorties; Somalian airland sorties; strategic airlift missions; and air refueling missions were flown or annually conducted by Air Force RC. The success of the program may be due in part to the uniqueness of the air frame as an operable unit and the relatively high full time support levels, and, therefore, not necessarily transferable to the other Services. Although DOD is moving cautiously beyond the experience of the Air Force RC and planners seem reluctant to place unnecessary reliance upon it, the USAR and ARNG have initiated "Project PRIME" and "Project Standard Bearer," respectively. Project PRIME, Priority Reserve Initiatives in Mobilization Enhancement, focuses on readiness of USAR Contingency Force Pool (CFP) units and access to individual volunteers from the IRR. Through

operational unit, humanitarian support unit, and operational unit integration programs, ARNG Project Standard Bearer, seeks voluntary access to units and individuals. Finally, at what may be perceived as the other end of the continuum, is increased reliance on authority to involuntarily order RC units and individuals to active duty.

As congressional deliberations began on the fiscal year 1995 defense authorization, focus remained on the questions of "duration of activation and early and assured access."¹⁹ Buttressed by the report, the search for remedy was manifested in the Administration's Department of Defense Legislative Program for the Second Session of the 103d Congress:

Section 214 would amend section 673b of title 10, United States Code. It would permit the activation of Selected Reserve units and members of the Selected Reserve not assigned to units organized to serve as units for an initial period of service of 180 days, with extension of an additional 180 days. Such an amendment would assure the availability of Selected Reserve units and individuals and would increase the flexibility of the Total Force in responding to a crisis. It would authorize the President to designate the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation to order up to 25,000 members of the Selected Reserve to active duty to support the early phases (up to 90 days) of an operational mission; e.g., to put in place the infrastructure for movement; to open the seaports; to provide air crews and maintenance; to establish enroute support; to set up and operate crisis action teams; to deploy civil affairs teams; to deploy special operations forces; to establish mobilization stations; and to surge logistics and medical support.²⁰

Senate Bill, S. 2182, "to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes,"²¹ included a provision "that would allow the President to use the authority under this section for a single 180 day call-up period."²² The Senate position also required "the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees ... an analysis of options for increasing Presidential call-up authority and assessment of the effects of these options on recruiting, retention, and employer support for the reserve components."²³

In amendment, the House offered a provision "that would increase the initial period of activation in section 673b from 90 to 180 days and would permit a follow-on period of activation of another 180 days as well."²⁴ Additionally, the House provided, "that if the President determines that augmentation of the active forces may be necessary for an operational mission that the President authorizes to be carried out, that President may, on or after the date of

that mission authorization, authorize the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation to order units of the Selected Reserve to active duty for up to 90 days."²⁵ This additional authority was limited to not more than 25,000 members.

In the House Report 103-701, Conference Report to accompany S. 2182, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337), the House receded with an amendment "that would amend section 673b of title 10, United States Code, to permit the President to authorize the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation to order up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve to active duty for a single period of 270 days, without the declaration of war or national emergency required for the general and partial mobilization authorities in sections 672 and 673 of title 10, United States Code."²⁶ The conferees also agreed to require "the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees ... an analysis of options for increasing Presidential call-up authority and assessment of the effects of these options on recruiting, retention, and employer support for the reserve components."²⁷ The report stated that:

The Department of Defense has indicated that the time required for the President to exercise his authority under section 673b of title 10, United States Code, will cause military planners to exclude reserve component personnel from contingency plans. The conferees reject that line of reasoning and fully expect the Department of Defense, and particularly the commanders of combatant commands, to continue to plan for, count on, and use members of the Selected Reserve among early deploying forces. Perceived impediments to the planning for timely use of reserve component personnel and units can and should be overcome without legislative action. In that light, conferees expect the Department of Defense and the White House to work together to develop and implement the plans and procedures necessary under a wide range of scenarios to ensure timely access to members of the Selected Reserve under section 673b of title 10, United States Code, and other authorities.²⁸

As deliberations on the fiscal year 1996 authorization approach, DOD seems to have shifted its attention. The Department of Defense Legislative Program for the First Session of the 104th Congress is replete with RC initiatives;²⁹ however, rather than duration and early and assured access, emphasis is on proposals encouraging the use of the RC and expanding the use of volunteers. Importantly, efforts focus on policy and regulatory reform as well as legislative remedy. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), in conjunction with FORSCOM, the Army Staff, and the Army RC, recently led an effort to develop procedures to enhance access to the Army RC. USASOC submitted 14 proposed changes to policies and regulations, seven of which were accepted.

On February 28, 1995, Representative Greg Laughlin, Democrat from Texas, drafted H.R. (Discussion Draft) cited as the "Reserve Forces Revitalization Act of 1995."³⁰ Originally intended to be introduced as "free-standing" legislation, Representative Bob Dornan, Democrat from California and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives, has agreed to consider the Bill in deliberations on the FY 96 National Defense Authorization.

Resting upon findings that:

(1) The end of the Cold War and the ensuing period of worldwide readjustment and reassessment has brought with it a host of new military challenges and opportunities

(2) Never before in time of peace have the Armed Forces been engaged in tasks in so many parts of the world

(3) The Persian Gulf War demonstrated the validity of the Total Force Policy, which places heavy reliance upon the reserve components for the execution of military missions

(4) The basic laws governing the organization and administration of the reserve components have not been comprehensively reexamined since the enactment in 1967 of the Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act (Public Law 90-168)

(5) A number of systemic problems have arisen under the existing reserve component statutory scheme which was designed in light of the Cold War era,³¹

the purpose of the legislation is "...to revise the basic statutory scheme governing the organization of the reserve components of the Armed Forces in order to recognize the

realities of reserve component partnership in the Total Force and changed circumstances in the post-Cold War era."³²

Mr. Laughlin's Bill includes ten major sections. In addition to establishing reporting requirements on tax incentives for employers of members of the RC and an income insurance program for Reservists who own businesses, "Title III--Reserve Component Accessibility"³³ would amend Chapter 1209 of Title 10, USC, by replacing Sections 12302, 12303, and 12304 to: increase the CINC's access to Reserve component-unique skills; allow use of federal Reserve assets for domestic emergencies; require periodic reports to Congress justifying continuation on active duty of Ready Reserve units; limit the number of mobilizations of Reservists during a given period; and require the notification of Congress by the President prior to exercise of call-up authority.³⁴

Section 12302, entitled "Reserve activation authority: Ready Reserve units and members"³⁵ is the centerpiece and would provide access to the Ready Reserve "in time of national emergency declared by the President, when the President determines that it is necessary to augment active forces for an operational mission, and when necessary to

provide Federal disaster relief to a State, when requested by the Governor."³⁶ Whenever intending to provide Reserve activation authority under the authority of this subsection, "the President shall, not less than 48 hours before providing such authority, transmit to Congress a report in writing, giving notice of the proposed exercise of authority and setting forth the circumstances necessitating the provision of Reserve activation authority."³⁷

Under the authority provided by the President, the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Transportation "may, without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit, any member not assigned to a unit, in the Ready Reserve under the jurisdiction of that Secretary, to active duty or active Federal service (other than for training), for a period not to exceed 24 consecutive months."³⁸ If an extension beyond the period is subsequently ordered, "the Secretary shall, not less than seven days before the extension becomes effective, submit to Congress a report, in writing, giving notice of the extension."³⁹ The authority is limited to "not more than 1,000,000 members of the Ready Reserve on active duty or in active Federal service (other than for training) without their consent under this section

at any one time."⁴⁰ Whenever Reserve activation authority is in effect, "the President shall, within two working days of the close of each fiscal year quarter during which units or members of the Ready Reserve are on active duty or in active Federal service pursuant to the exercise of that authority, transmit to Congress a report regarding the necessity for those units or members being retained on active duty or in active Federal service, as the case may be."⁴¹

Section 12303, entitled "Reserve activation authority: release from active Federal service,"⁴² directs the Secretary of Defense to prescribe policies and procedures for release from active duty under Reserve activation authority under Section 12302. Section 12304, entitled "Reserve activation authority: limitation on frequency of activation of units and members,"⁴³ would, subject to waiver by the President, limit the frequency of activations to not more than once in any 24-month period.

...,because it's important

Whether a revolution as some suggest or quiet evolution, much has changed since General Abram's introduction of the integration policies of the Total Force.

Among the most dramatic are the sources and nature of the global threat. Natural adaptation of the policy and adjustment of the missions and composition of the armed forces are almost inevitable; however, general repudiation of the Total Force Policy seems improbable. On the contrary, recent updates to the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy seem to indicate just the opposite, continued and substantial reliance on Reserve forces.

Shortly after President William J. Clinton signed and released a new National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, February 1995, General John M. Shalikashvili, CJCS, signed and released a new National Military Strategy of the United States of America, February 1995, A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement. The third component of the strategy is the ability of the Armed Forces to fight and win, and serves as the ultimate guarantor of our vital interests. In generating military forces in the event of war:

Substantial Reserve forces will be committed to combat and combat support missions early in any major regional contingency. To backfill active forces elsewhere and to prepare for unforeseen contingencies, some Reserve component forces can expect to be mobilized immediately and remain on active duty throughout the conflict, even though they are not directly involved in operations. "

Implicit in reliance on the RC is commensurate authority to gain access during times of national crisis.

Over the course of the last two decades, the Executive and Legislative branches have actively participated in a very productive dialogue on access to Reserve forces. Although still governed principally by laws and policies instituted during the Cold War, efforts within DOD; between the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives; and deliberations in which all are involved are beginning to show signs of producing necessary change. This partnership is good government. The process is not pristine, but must continue. Why?..., because it's important.

Appendix A

Each Service retains significant capabilities in the Reserve component:⁴⁵

- Army: 100% of water supply battalions and judge advocate general and public affairs units; 97% of civil affairs units; 86% of petroleum support battalions; 79% of motor battalions; 76% of maintenance and combat heavy engineer battalions; 75% of psychological operations units; 73% of hospitals; 57% of terminal battalions; and 44% of special forces groups
- Navy: 100% of mobile inshore undersea warfare units, U.S.-based logistics aircraft squadrons, strike rescue/special warfare support helicopter squadrons, and heavy logistics support; 93% of cargo handling battalions; 85% of Military Sealift Command personnel; 61% of intelligence program personnel; and 48% of fleet hospitals

- Marine Corps: 100% of civil affairs groups; 50% of air-naval gunfire liaison companies, tank battalions, force reconnaissance companies, and aerial refueler transport squadrons; 27% of infantry regiments; 25% of light armored infantry battalions, engineer support battalions, and artillery regiments; 22% of light attack helicopter squadrons; and 21% of fighter/attack squadrons
- Air Force: 100% of weather reconnaissance, aerial spraying, and tactical reconnaissance units; 97% of aeromedical evacuation aircrews; 75% of aerial port units; 61% of tactical airlift units; 50% of strategic airlift (associate) aircrews; and 45% of air refueling/strategic tanker units
- Coast Guard: 100% of deployable port security units

Appendix B

At the end of the Cold War, Title 10, USC, included five levels of authority under which access to Reservists and Guardsmen could be gained:⁴⁶

- Total Mobilization--Sections 671a, 672(a)--required a Congressional declaration of war or national emergency and provided access to the Total Reserve
- Full Mobilization--Sections 671a, 672(a)--required a Congressional declaration of war or national emergency and provided access to the Total Reserve*
- Partial Mobilization--Sections 673, 673b; 6485--required Congressional or Presidential declaration of a national emergency and provided access to the Ready Reserve for up to 24 months
- Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC)--Section 673b--required Congressional notification by the President and provided access to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve** initially for up to 90 days with provision for an additional 90 days

- Selective Mobilization--Sections 3500, 8500; 331, 332; 673--allowed Congress and the President to order expansion of the AC through access to RC units and individuals***

*Total and Full Mobilization are inherently different, but, for the purposes of this essay, have similar implications for access to RC forces.

**Added in 1976, Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up authority was originally limited to 50,000 Reservists. Amendments in 1980 and 1986 subsequently extended the authority to 200,000.

***Selective Mobilization is not used for contingency operations.

Notes

¹ General John W. Vessey, Jr., quoted in Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime," Parameters, Vol. XXI, Summer 1991, p. 46.

² Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime," Parameters, Vol. XXI, Summer 1991, p. 43.

³ Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., quoted in Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime," Parameters, Vol. XXI, Summer 1991, p. 46.

⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, Defense 94 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), Issue 5, p. 15.

⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1993, Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 13.

⁶ Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., quoted in Charles E. Heller, The New Military Strategy and Its Impact on the Reserve Components (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute, 1991), p. 26.

⁷ Arnold Punaro, quoted in Charles E. Heller, The New Military Strategy and Its Impact on the Reserve Components (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute, 1991), p. 26.

⁸ General George C. Marshall, quoted in Charles E. Heller, Twenty-First Century Force: A Federal Army and a Militia (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute, 1993), p. 6.

⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, National Military Strategy of the United States of America, February 1995, A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), pp. 2-3.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, Accessibility of Reserve Component Forces (Washington, 1994), p. i.

¹¹ U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Legislative Program for the First Session of the 103d Congress (Washington, 1993), pp.

¹² U.S. Congress, House Report 103-357, Conference Report (to accompany H.R. 2401, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 1.

¹³ Ibid, p. 681.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1993, Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 178.

¹⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, Accessibility of Reserve Component Forces (Washington, 1994), p. iii.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, The Bottom Up Review: Forces for a New Era (Washington, 1993), p.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, Accessibility of Reserve Component Forces (Washington, 1994), p. i.

²⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Legislative Program for the Second Session of the 103d Congress (Washington, 1994), pp. 17-18.

²¹ U.S. Congress, House Report 103-701, Conference Report (to accompany S. 2182, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 1.

²² Ibid, pp. 701-702.

²³ Ibid, p. 702.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Legislative Program for the First Session of the 104th Congress (Washington, 1994).

³⁰ U.S. Congress, House, H.R. (Discussion Draft), Reserve Forces Revitalization Act of 1995 (Washington, 1995), p. 1.

³¹ Ibid, pp. 2-3.

³² Ibid, p. 3.

³³ Ibid, p. 23.

³⁴ Representative Greg Laughlin (D-TX), "Reserve Revitalization Act," The Officer, April 1995, pp. 39-40.

³⁵ U.S. Congress, House, H.R. (Discussion Draft), Reserve Forces Revitalization Act of 1995 (Washington, 1995), p. 23.

³⁶ Ibid, p. 24.

³⁷ Ibid, pp. 24-25.

³⁸ Ibid, p. 25.

³⁹ Ibid, p. 26.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 27.

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 26.

⁴² Ibid, p. 28.

⁴³ Ibid, p. 29.

⁴⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, National Military Strategy of the United States of America, February 1995, A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 15.

⁴⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, Defense 94 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), Issue 5, pp. 16-18.

⁴⁶ Charles E. Heller, Total Force: Federal Reserves and State National Guards (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), pp. 10-11.

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